In recent years, East Africa has been facing a surge of Islamic insurgencies as the region offers fertile ground for groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS to expand their global presence. These insurgent groups are often made up of thousands of fighters armed with an impressive array of weaponry, including rocket launchers, light rifles, heavy machine guns, and even anti-aircraft guns.
While some of these weapons are seized from local security forces during attacks, most are obtained through illicit arms trafficking networks that span the entire continent and beyond. A large quantity of these weapons begin their journey in Yemen, where they are smuggled across the Gulf of Aden into Somalia, and then distributed across Africa.
The Gulf of Aden provides extremely favorable conditions for arms trafficking and other illicit activities. It is only 29 kilometers wide at its narrowest point, and it sits between two of the world’s most unstable countries ravaged by ongoing civil wars, where weapons are widely available and the coastlines are rarely patrolled.
What makes the Gulf of Aden trafficking network particularly interesting, is that it is entirely run by the Islamic insurgent groups, giving them a complete monopoly over the main entry point for illicit arms entering East Africa.
One of the leading figures in the trafficking network is Abdirahman Mohamed Omar, a member of the Islamic State in Somalia (IS-S) who is considered to be the “most active illicit-arms importer” in the Puntland state of Somalia.
At the beginning of November, Omar was sanctioned by the United States for his involvement in an arms smuggling syndicate which included members of both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. The two groups are generally considered sworn enemies who often battle each other in Somalia and Yemen. However, the November sanctions report suggests that they are willing to put their hostilities aside and work together towards their shared interest of acquiring weapons.
Not only does Omar import weapons for IS-S, but also for al-Shabaab — Somalia’s largest Islamic insurgent group with strong links to al-Qaeda and currently at war with the Somali government.
The Yemeni Connection
According to the November report, Omar’s contact in Yemen is a weapons dealer known as Salem al-Hayashi.
In October 2017, al-Hayashi was marked by the United States as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist for coordinating shipments of weapons for al-Qaeda’s branch in Yemen, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). He also co-owned the al-Khayr Supermarket chain, which had locations in several Yemeni cities but was eventually sanctioned by the US for laundering money and helping to finance AQAP operations.
Between 2018 and 2020, Omar made regular electronic payments to al-Hayashi, amounting to tens of thousands of dollars. This suggests that al-Hayashi was purchasing large quantities of weapons for the Gulf network to resell for financial gain, as rifles smuggled from Yemen can be sold at three times the market price in Somalia. Due to Yemen’s ongoing civil war, weapons are extremely easy to obtain but difficult to trace.
The majority of the Gulf trafficking network’s weapons are likely obtained through al-Hayashi’s connection to other arms dealers who maintain membership in Yemen’s Houthi movement. The Houthis receive massive regular shipments of weapons from Iran to support their fight against the Yemeni government and Saudi-led coalition. However, many of these weapons are rerouted and end up in the hands of the East African insurgents.
A detailed research report by the GITOC found evidence that many Chinese and Iranian weapons being provided by Iran to the Houthis are being diverted to Somalia through illicit markets.
It is unlikely that Iran intends for these weapons to end up in the hands of the Somali insurgent groups. Rather, Houthi commanders are likely selling portions of their weapons stockpiles for personal profit. One of the most likely individuals responsible for this is Fares Mohammed Mana’a, a major arms dealer and State Minister in the Houthi administration in Yemen. A 2018 United Nations report found that Mana’a is an associate of Salem al-Hayashi.
Due to this connection, Iranian and Chinese weapons are becoming more common among the ranks of al-Shabaab and the Islamic State in Somalia.
Transportation
The transportation side of the network is largely run by Mohamoud Yusuf, a former pirate kingpin based in the Puntland state of Somalia. As stated in the November sanctions report, he is related to the leader of IS-S, Abdulkadir Mumin, and coordinates shipments based directly on the group’s requests for weapons. Yusuf maintains regular contact with al-Hayashi in Yemen, where the weapons are purchased, and then coordinates with Omar to smuggle the weapons across the Gulf to Somalia.
Yusuf’s network of smuggling vessels run regularly between Yemen and Somalia. The weapons are picked up from the Yemeni port city of Ash Shihr, located in eastern Hadramawt Governorate, which has previously served as an AQAP stronghold.
Yusuf’s smuggling vessels are often disguised as fishing boats and traditional dhows, to avoid raising suspicion as they cross the Gulf. The weapons are supposedly stored in the lower deck areas, concealed under ice and fish.
The Puntland region remains the primary entry point for illicit arms being smuggled into Somalia due to its close proximity to Yemen, history of maritime piracy, and the coastline being dotted with unregulated fishing villages.
Yusuf’s vessels unload their cargo at the Puntland coastal villages of Qandala or Caluula, where Yusuf is said to maintain a personal militia to handle the offloaded goods.
According to the GITOC, once the weapons arrive in Puntland, they are sent further inland to the city of Galkayo, which “hosts a substantial black market for light arms and functions as a distribution hub where arms originating in the north are sent onward to southern Somalia and west to the Ethiopian border”.
As stated in the November report, vessels operated by Omar’s men usually take a different route and offload at the Port of Bacaad, in Puntland state, where Omar has been based since 2021. Unlike the weapons entering Somalia on Yusuf’s boats, which usually end up in some form of black market, Omar arranges for his to be transported directly to the insurgent groups.
When they arrive in port, Omar contacts Ahmed Haji Ali to “load the weapons onto camels and donkeys, where they are concealed in white sugar and rice sacks”. The weapons are then transported at night to the Qandala Mountains where they are either picked up by al-Shabaab or taken to the Islamic State’s refuge in the Golis Mountains.
Onward to Neighboring East African States
Once they arrive in Somalia, the weapons are often sent to, or purchased by, other insurgent groups operating across East Africa, including in Kenya, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and the Congo.
As mentioned previously, the city of Galkaayo hosts a substantial arms trafficking hub which facilitates the flow of weapons across the Somali border, into neighboring Ethiopia and Kenya.
Ethiopia shares the largest border with Somalia, which explains why so many of these Chinese weapons are being used by Ethiopian rebel groups, particularly in the Oromia and Tigray regions.
Similarly, a video released by al-Shabaab of an attack against a US military base in Kenya, in 2020, shows their use of Chinese-made Type 56-2 rifles and Type-69 RPGs, which probably originated from an Iranian arms shipment to Yemen.
Similar weapons are also falling into the hands of Islamic State insurgents further across the African continent, as a result of the organization’s own network of over-land smugglers.
According to a UN Security Council report released earlier this year, the Islamic State branch in Somalia runs the “al-Karrar office”, which acts as a support hub for all other Islamic State branches in East Africa, including those in the Congo and Mozambique. The al-Karrar office is responsible for transferring funds, fighters and weapons between these various branches. It also coordinates with the “Umm al-Qura office”, which is run by the Islamic State’s branch based in Yemen.
The use of these regional “offices” demonstrates that the Islamic State can utilize a well-established network of smugglers and safe routes to move weapons from one conflict zone to another, without being detected.
The increasing use of Iranian and Chinese weapons by Islamic State branches further across East Africa proves the success of these networks.
As long as there are conflicts in the region, weapons will remain easily accessible and insurgent groups will continue to exploit the porous borders.
The newly-reimplemented UN arms embargo on Somalia may restrict the import of illicit weapons, but this will require a serious effort by all countries involved in its enforcement. Stronger measures should also be taken against the flow of weapons into Yemen, particularly those being sent by Iran.
Whether on land or by sea, the traffickers always seem to find new ways of smuggling weapons and other illicit goods into Africa. Unfortunately, as long as there is a demand for weapons, there will always be a supply.